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Abstract
This article offers an exegetical-theological analysis of Rom. 4:20: ‘No dis-
trust made him waver (diakr0nesqai) concerning the promise of God’ (NRSV).
It challenges the common assumption that our customary descriptions and
definitions of ‘doubt’ may be applied—via negativa—to the attitude or
disposition of Abraham. When Paul uses the word diakr0nesqai in this con-
text, he does not intend to say that Abraham’s disposition was free from
doubt, uncertainty, or hesitation. Rather, Paul had in mind that Abraham
did not oppose God in a presumptuous attitude, offend him through con-
ceited enquiries, or question him in order to overturn his word. This in-
terpretation counters the exegetical communis opinio, but has veritable
precursors—John Chrysostom, John Calvin, and Markus Barth—and, at
the same time, conforms well to the line of thought of Paul’s letter.
The object of Paul’s accusation against Greeks and Jews (Romans 1–3) is
less an intrapersonal contradiction or inconsistency rather than an inter-
personal conflict between God and human being. Significantly, the con-
textual argument is supported by a lexicographical fact: The meaning ‘to
doubt’ for diakr0nesqai is unattested prior to the New Testament; in clas-
sical/Hellenistic Greek the verb comprises, inter alia, the notions of ‘separ-
ation’ and ‘dispute’.
‘FOR two millennia, readers of the Christian Scriptures have
been fascinated and puzzled by Paul’s letter to the Romans.
The fascination continues unabated, and readers of the letter
continue to approach the text as if it held answers to some of
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their most profound questions about God [and] God’s relation to
humanity . . . ’.1 With these words, Mark Reasoner opens his
study on the history of interpretation of Paul’s most famous
letter; his study seeks to ‘give . . . voice to past conversations on
key texts of Romans’ and to ‘help Romans readers hear how
their questions about Romans have been framed, asked, and
considered in interpretations of the letter’ since the third cen-
tury.2 One such key text is Paul’s revolutionary exegesis of Gen.
15:6 in Romans 4,3 which includes—in the words of James
Dunn—the ‘clearest and most powerful exposition of what he
understood by pistis’.4 Towards the end of the chapter, Paul
obviously tackles one of the most profound questions about
God and his relation to humanity: the question of the correlation
between ‘faith’ and ‘doubt’. There, Paul’s depiction of
Abraham’s faith includes the following aspect (Rom. 4:20):
e2" de; t1n 2paggel0an toA qeoA o2
diekr0qh tI 2pist0G 2ll1
2nedunam0qh tI p0stei, do1"
d0xan tJ qeJ
No distrust made him waver
concerning the promise of
God, but he grew strong in his
faith as he gave glory to God.
(NRSV)
For the purpose of this study it is essential to realize what is
commonly, in religious and philosophical contexts, considered as
‘doubt’ or as ‘wavering’. Accordingly, the first part deals with
descriptions and definitions of ‘doubt’ by way of a brief look at
four symbolic ‘conversations’ about this phenomenon. The main
part of the essay concerns the question: How are we to under-
stand the word diakr0nesqai in Rom. 4:20? Both parts are inter-
related, for most, if not all modern translations and
interpretations render diakr0nesqai with ‘doubt’, ‘waver’, or the
like. My goal is to dispute the common assumption that our
customary descriptions and definitions of ‘doubt’ may be
applied—via negativa—to the attitude or disposition of
Abraham in an indiscriminate manner. In short: Paul intended
to say something else than ‘Abraham did not doubt’.
1 Mark Reasoner, Romans in Full Circle: A History of Interpretation
(Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox, 2005), p. ix.
2 Ibid.
3 Cf. Benjamin Schliesser, Abraham’s Faith in Romans 4: Paul’s Concept of
Faith in Light of the History of Reception of Genesis 15:6 (WUNT 2/224;
Tu¨bingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2007).
4 James D. G. Dunn, The Theology of Paul the Apostle (Grand Rapids, MI:
Eerdmans, 1998), p. 377.
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1. DESCRIPTIONS AND DEFINITIONS OF ‘DOUBT’
What is doubt? Let us listen at first to a literary character, two
key figures of modern Geistesgeschichte, and a paradigmatic
postmodern individual. In his pastiche of the famous Early
Modern novel Don Quixote, Graham Greene tells the story of the
priest Monsignor Quixote—purportedly a descendant of the
(fictitious) Don Quixote—who is urged by his bishop to take a
holiday.5 So Quixote is travelling with an old Seat 600
(aVectionately called ‘Rocinante’) through Spain, of course not
without being accompanied by ‘Sancho Panza’, the Communist
ex-mayor of his hometown El Toboso. On the trip, the two men
engage in dialogues about Catholicism and Communism, and
Quixote reflects on his own faith. He is quite sure that some of his
parishioners really do keep their Catholic faith, but he himself has
to confess: ‘I am riddled by doubts. I am sure of nothing, not even
of the existence of God, but doubt is not treachery as you
Communists seem to think. Doubt is human. Oh, I want to
believe that it is all true—and that want is the only certain thing I
feel.’6 This brief episode vividly depicts one aspect of the
dialectics of faith and doubt. On the one hand there is a deep
longing for certainty—‘Oh, I want to believe that it is all true’, and
on the other hand not a single element or dogma of the Catholic
faith, not even the existence of God, presents itself to him as
certain—‘I am sure of nothing’. The only certain thing, his
fundamentum inconcussum, is precisely the desire ‘to believe that it
is all true’.
This is diVerent from Martin Luther’s ‘doubt’, his Anfechtung,
which overpowers him like a flood and precludes all possibilities of
his own action and reaction: the aZicted human being is utterly
5 Graham Greene, Monsignor Quixote (1982) (Penguin Classics; London:
Penguin Books, 2008). Cf. Frank D. Rees, Wrestling with Doubt: Theological
Reflections on the Journey of Faith (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 2001),
p. 2.
6 Greene, Monsignor Quixote, p. 155. To be sure, Quixote takes action
against his doubts. ‘The habitual way of counteracting doubt for Quixote is
rooted in his observance of daily private devotions and the familiar words of
the Catholic Tridentine liturgy’ (Michael G. Brennan, Graham Greene:
Fictions, Faith and Authorship [London and New York: Continuum, 2010],
p. 147). Though suspended from his duties, he remains a priest—but a
priest only to himself. As for Graham Greene himself, Cedric Watts notes:
‘Greene was thoroughly Pyrrhonian: like a devoted follower of the great scep-
tic, Pyrrho of Elis, he was prepared to be sceptical about scepticism’ (Cedric
Watts, A Preface to Greene [London and New York: Longman, 1997], p. 106).
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‘passive, suVering, accused, convicted’.7 Doubt forces him to hold
on to the promissio dei anew.8
Again, this is remarkably diVerent from Rene´ Descartes’s
methodological doubt. Descartes set himself the agenda: de
omnibus dubitandum est; doubt for him is intellectual activity,
radical method, creative process. He chooses an ideal time of
leisure and serenity and decides freely to adjourn to his fireplace in
the sitting-room in order to contemplate the philosophical subject
of ‘doubt’.9 His ‘highest expectation’ is ‘to discover only one thing
that is certain and indubitable’.10
Post-Enlightenment successors of Descartes represent a dra-
matic turn: They claim that within the postmodern (or late
modern) paradigm one is not entitled to ask for ultimate certainty.
In fact, both theology and philosophy are in their view utterly
incapable of providing or producing such certainty. They consider
the philosophical task not as ‘endeavour to annihilate doubts’, but
as ‘endeavour to generate uncertainty’ which is to destroy and
dissolve all kinds of certainty.11
This portrayal of four symbolic ‘conversations’ and reflections
about the phenomenon of doubt represents diVerent types of
approaches to and assessments of the experience and practice
of doubt. Rene´ Descartes, hailed by Hegel as the ‘true founder of
modern philosophy’,12 transformed doubt into a radical method of
7 Gerhard Ebeling, ‘Gewißheit und Zweifel: Die Situation des Glaubens
im Zeitalter nach Luther und Descartes’ (1967), in idem, Wort und Glaube,
vol. 2: Beitra¨ge zur Fundamentaltheologie und zur Lehre von Gott (Tu¨bingen:
Mohr Siebeck, 1969), pp. 138–83, at 153 (if not otherwise indicated, transla-
tions are mine.).
8 Cf. Helmut Thielicke, Glauben und Denken in der Neuzeit: Die großen
Systeme der Theologie und Religionsphilosophie (Tu¨bingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1983),
pp. 61–2.
9 Cf. Ebeling, ‘Gewißheit und Zweifel’, p. 153: ‘ut jam me hic esse, foco
assidere, hiemali esse indutum.’
10 Meditationes 2. 1 (trans. John Veitch).
11 Andreas Urs Sommer, Die Kunst des Zweifelns: Anleitung zum skeptischen
Philosophieren (Beck’sche Reihe 1664; 2d edn.; Mu¨nchen: Beck, 2007), p. 10;
cf. idem, ‘Religionsverzicht um des guten Lebens willen? Eine skeptische
U¨bung’, Hermeneutische Bla¨tter 1/2 (2011), ed. A. Hunziker and B.
Schliesser, pp. 135–46.
12 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, ‘Vorlesungen u¨ber die Geschichte der
Philosophie. Dritter Band’, in Sa¨mtliche Werke, vol. 19, ed. H. Glockner (repr.
Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Friedrich Frommann, 1959), p. 331 (‘Rene´ Descartes
ist in der Tat der wahrhafte Anfa¨nger der modernen Philosophie, insofern sie
das Denken zum Princip macht.’ Hegel adds [p. 335]: ‘Und daß nur vom
Denken angefangen werden mu¨sse, dru¨ckt er so aus, daß man an Allem zwei-
feln mu¨sse’—hence, the principle of thinking manifests itself at first in the
principle of doubting).
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rational selection and insisted that only indubitability establishes
truth13 and thus sought to overturn scepticism.14 Martin Luther,
who marks—again according to Hegel—the beginning of the
freedom of the spirit,15 experienced ‘doubt’ as a disastrous, forced
rather than ‘free’ state of the spirit, which constantly and
acrimoniously fights against certitude.16 The two are framed, on
the one hand, by the literary character Monsignor Quixote, the
somewhat cynical renegade priest, for whom doubt is human and a
‘traveling companion’ of faith,17 and on the other hand, by the
modern-day sceptic, for whom ‘doubt’ has become a ‘signature of
human maturity’,18 a part of his or her modus vivendi, indeed ars
vivendi.
All four, however, share a common idea when they speak of
doubt: the split of a person’s heart or mind into two parts.19 This
is reflected in both the Romance and Germanic words for ‘doubt’,
for in all these languages, the element of ‘two-ness’ is decisive:
‘dubitatio’, ‘le doute’, ‘la duda’, ‘il dubbio’, ‘Zweifel’, and ‘doubt’
are all words that include the numeral ‘two’.20 English diction-
aries, for instance, define ‘doubt’ as ‘a feeling or attitude that one
does not know the truth, truthfulness, or trustworthiness of
someone or something’;21 and they oVer a range of meanings that
all converge in the idea of ‘two-ness’: ‘1a: an uncertainty of belief
or opinion that often interferes with decision-making b: a
deliberate suspension of judgment 2: a state of aVairs giving rise
to uncertainty, hesitation, or suspense 3a: a lack of confidence:
distrust b: an inclination not to believe or accept.’22 Thus, the
etymology of these nouns duly demonstrates that the one who
doubts finds him- or herself in a state of uncertainty or diYdence,
13 Cf. Janet Broughton, Descartes’s Method of Doubt (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2002), pp. 166–8.
14 Rene´ Descartes, Objectiones VII (1642), ed. C. Adam and P. Tennery,
7,550: ‘scepticorum dubitationem . . . everti.’
15 Hegel, ‘Vorlesungen u¨ber die Geschichte der modernen Philosophie’,
p. 254.
16 ‘Pugnant autem haec duo acerrime inter se, certitudo et dubitatio’ (WA
39 II, 163).
17 Cf. Espen Dahl, In Between: The Holy Beyond Modern Dichotomies, trans.
Brian McNeil (Research in Contemporary Religion, 6; Go¨ttingen: Vanden-
hoeck & Ruprecht, 2011), p. 152.
18 Thielicke, Glauben und Denken, p. 63.
19 Cf. Rees, Wrestling with Doubt, p. 2.
20 Cf. Gunther Zimmermann, ‘‘‘An Gott zweifeln’’—eine logische Untersu-
chung’, Neue Zeitschrift fu¨r Systematische Theologie 48 (2006), pp. 305–20, at 307.
21 Merriam-Webster online; 5http://www.merriam-webster.com/thesaurus/
doubt%5Bnoun%5D)4.
22 Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary, 11th edn. (2003), p. 375.
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since he or she has two conflicting attitudes towards a certain
subject-matter. He or she does not contest or refute it in its
entirety, but at the same time does not aYrm it wholeheartedly. It
is an intrapersonal conflict between two positions, both of which
might possibly be true.23
But what about the Greek word diakr0nesqai, which purportedly
informs us most properly on the New Testament idea of ‘doubt’?
It occurs in prominent passages such as Mark 11:23 where Jesus
says (NRSV): ‘Truly I tell you, if you say to this mountain,
‘‘Be taken up and thrown into the sea’’, and if you do not doubt in
your heart, but believe that what you say will come to pass, it will
be done for you.’ The other occurrences are spread throughout the
New Testament, mostly having the noun p0sti" in their immediate
context.24 In all these instances, diakr0nesqai is translated as
‘doubt’ (or the like) in virtually all modern translations, no matter
which language. And almost all commentaries follow and support
this translation practice. In the following, this opinio communis will
be scrutinized in the light of the descriptions and definitions of
‘doubt’ presented in this section, by exploring the use of the verb
diakr0nesqai in Rom. 4:20.
2. PAUL’S USE OF THE VERB DIAKRINESQAI
As already mentioned, James Dunn noted that in Rom. 4:18–
21(22), Paul presents the ‘most powerful exposition’ of what he
understood by ‘faith’.25 Faith’s counterpart, doubt, purportedly
occurs in Paul’s statement that ‘Abraham did not ‘‘doubt’’ in
unbelief ’ (o2 diekr0qh tI 2pist0G). Irrespective of which translation
of Romans one is consulting, the notion of ‘doubt’ or ‘hesitation’
or ‘wavering’ is unanimously present, even as early as in the
Vulgate. A random selection of translations illustrates this fact:
Vulgate: ‘non haesitavit diYdentia’
Luther: ‘Denn er zweifelte nicht . . . durch Unglauben’
Segond 21: ‘Il n’a pas doute´, par incre´dulite´’
KJV: ‘He staggered not . . . through unbelief’
NRSV: ‘No distrust made him waver’
23 This follows closely Zimmermann, ‘‘‘An Gott zweifeln’’ ’, p. 307.
24 Matt. 21:21; Mark 11:23; Rom. 4:20; 14:23; Jas. 1:6; Jude 20–2; cf. in
addition—without the correlate p0sti"—Acts 10:20. Apart from these passages,
diakr0nesqai occurs in Jas. 2:4; Jude 9; Acts 11:2, where the meaning ‘dispute’
or the like is assumed; see in addition Acts 11:12 (v.l.: Byzantine text) and
Luke 11:38 (v.l.: Codex Bezae). The active diakr0nein is found in Matt. 16:3;
Acts 11:12; 15:9; 1 Cor. 4:7; 6:5; 11:29, 31; 14:29.
25 Dunn, Theology of Paul, p. 377.
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2.1. A Philological Perplexity
However, a comparison of the alleged New Testament mean-
ing with the semantics of the medio-passive diakr0nesqai in clas-
sical/Hellenistic Greek reveals a perplexing fact: There is no
evidence prior to the New Testament that diakr0nesqai takes on
the meaning ‘doubt’ or the like. Lexica list three semantic fields
for this verb in classical/Hellenistic Greek:26 1. to be separated
or to be dissolved (into elements), 2. to come to a decision or to
get it decided, and 3. to contend or to dispute. As for the active
verb diakr0nw, which occurs eight times in the New Testament,
scholars use translations that remain within the verb’s ‘classical/
Hellenistic Greek parameters, i.e., discern, decide, or separate’.27
Most recent New Testament lexicography proposes that one is
to follow ‘[a] thoroughly diachronic approach that includes the
later phases of the Greek language . . . to provide a more complete
understanding of the vocabulary of the New Testament’.28 This
approach, however, does not alter, but rather intensifies, the
sense of perplexity with respect to the verb in question. A pio-
neer of this approach, Chrys Caragounis maintains that
in Neohellenic, the verb diakr0nw occurs frequently, its chief mean-
ings being to discern, to distinguish, to characterize. The medio-passive
diakr0nomai occurs often enough but in the sense of to be characterized
by, to be distinguished, e.g. of a scientist, an athlete who distinguishes
himself through his achievement, etc . . . . This goes for both
Katharevousa and Demotike . . . In Neohellenic the New Testament
use of diakr0nesqai in the sense of ‘to doubt’ is unknown.29
Notwithstanding these lexicographical facts, Joachim
Jeremias stated in an important paper on the line of thought
26 Cf. Peter Spitaler, ‘Diakr0nesqai in Mt. 21:21, Mk. 11:23, Acts 10:20,
Rom. 4:20, 14:23, Jas. 1:6, and Jude 22—the ‘‘Semantic Shift’’ that Went
Unnoticed by Patristic Authors’, NT 49 (2007), pp. 1–39, at 1–2, n. 2.
Spitaler refers to the dictionaries of Franz Passow, Handwo¨rterbuch der
Griechischen Sprache, vol. 1: A–D (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche
Buchgesellschaft, 1970), and Henry George Liddell and Robert Scott, A
Greek–English Lexicon, rev. Henry Stuart Jones (9th edn.; Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1996). He adds that in the New Testament ‘only Acts 11:2, Jas. 2:4,
and Jude 9 are said to reflect classical/Hellenistic meaning’.
27 Spitaler ‘Diakr0nesqai’, p. 1.
28 David S. Hasselbrook, Studies in New Testament Lexicography: Advancing
toward a Full Diachronic Approach with the Greek Language (WUNT 2/303;
Tu¨bingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2011), p. 14. Hasselbrook names as predecessors of
this ‘full diachronic approach’ Georgios N. Hatzidakis, Chrys C. Caragounis,
and John A. L. Lee.
29 Chrys C. Caragounis (private correspondence, 20 Aug. 2011). However, he
does not concur with me in my critique of the lexicographical status quo.
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in Romans 4: ‘Though there is no evidence for diakr0nesqai as ‘‘to
doubt’’ or ‘‘to hesitate’’ prior to the New Testament, this mean-
ing is so strongly attested in the New Testament that the trans-
lation ‘‘to doubt’’ is based on solid ground.’30 According to
Jeremias, the meaning of the passage is as follows: ‘Abraham
has nothing but the promise. But he considers God’s word to
be most certain and firm. He clings to the word. He believes in it
without being deterred. With this undeterred trust he gave glory
to God.’31 Jeremias’s point of reference is Bauer’s dictionary,
which concedes that the meaning ‘to have reservations, to
doubt’ appears first in the New Testament.32 It insinuates that
the shift of meaning manifesting itself in the New Testament
emerges from one basic classical/Hellenistic meaning of the
word: The outward activity of contending or disputing (i.e. the
classical/Hellenistic meaning) is transformed into the internal
activity of ‘contending or disputing with oneself’, from which
the meaning ‘to doubt’ can be deduced.33 This description
goes back at least as far as to ‘the beginning of modern scientific
lexicography’,34 namely to Christian Abraham Wahl’s Clavis
Novi Testamenti philologica.35
Some even interpret this specific New Testament development
as a proof for the uniqueness of the New Testament Greek or—
as does Friedrich Bu¨chsel in his TDNT article—as an
example for the power of the Gospel to produce language.36
30 Joachim Jeremias, ‘Die Gedankenfu¨hrung in Ro¨m 4: Zum paulinischen
Glaubensversta¨ndnis’, in Foi et Salut selon S. Paul: E´pıˆtre aux Romains 1,16.
Colloque œcume´nique a` l’abbaye de S. Paul hors les murs, 16–21 avril 1968
(AnBib 42; Rome: Institut biblique pontifical, 1970), pp. 51–8 (and discussion
with Eduard Schweizer, Markus Barth, Rudolf Pesch, Jules Cambier, Stanislas
Lyonnet, and W. C. van Unnik, pp. 59–65), at 56.
31 Jeremias, ‘Die Gedankenfu¨hrung in Ro¨m 4’, p. 57.
32 Walter Bauer, Griechisch-deutsches Wo¨rterbuch zu den Schriften des Neuen
Testaments und der fru¨hchristlichen Literatur, ed. K. Aland and B. Aland
(6th edn.; Berlin and New York: de Gruyter, 1988), p. 370.
33 Ibid.
34 Frederick W. Danker, Multipurpose Tools for Bible Study (rev. and exp.
edn.; Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 1993), p. 110.
35 Christian Abraham Wahl, Clavis Novi Testamenti philologica: Usibus scho-
larum et iuvenum theologiae studiosorum accommodate (1822) (2nd edn.; Leipzig:
Johann Ambrosius Barth, 1829), p. 285: ‘ich bin mit mir selbst im Streite’. Cf.
Christianus Gottlob Wilke, Clavis Novi Testamenti philologica: Usibus scho-
larum et iuvenum theologiae studiosorum accommodate, vol. 1 (Dresden and
Leipzig: Libraria Arnoldiana, 1841), p. 220: ‘dubito (in contrario discerno,
ut dubius haeream, Utrum eligam, sich mit sich entzweien)’.
36 Friedrich Bu¨chsel, Art. ‘kr0nw ktl.’, TWNT vol. 3, pp. 920–55, at 951:
‘Jedenfalls beweist diakr0nomai, und was sich von seiner Geschichte noch auf-
hellen la¨ßt, die sprachbildende Kraft des Evangeliums.’
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This terminology obviously alludes to the methodological prin-
ciple of the forerunner of the TDNT, Hermann Cremer’s
Biblico-Theological Lexicon of New Testament Greek. In the intro-
duction Cremer maintains that it is his goal to produce a lexicon
which recognizes ‘what Schleiermacher calls ‘‘the language-
moulding power of Christianity’’ ’37 and which seeks to uncover
the ‘inner’, spiritual meaning of words.
According to Adolf Deissmann, this is an illegitimate philolo-
gical approach, and he attacked Cremer’s methodology head on.
He showed in his Bible Studies38 that the authors of the New
Testament did not use a particular, possibly even inspired Greek.
Rather than the ‘language of the Holy Ghost’ they were using
Koine Greek, ‘the lingua franca of the whole Roman Empire by
the first century CE’.39 As Deissmann himself contended in his
‘Selbstdarstellung’, it was his goal to ‘secularize dogmatic
Philologia sacra’:40 ‘This is how it came to my Bibelstudien
(1895) and Neue Bibelstudien (1897). Above all, their impact
was to free the special ‘‘Biblical Greek’’ from its solitary confine-
ment, after having been unnecessarily and vigorously isolated by
theologians and philologists.’41 Deissmann intended to merge the
results of his studies into a large-scale dictionary of the New
Testament42—a plan that he eventually could not carry out
due to his overwhelming teaching responsibilities, the turbu-
lences surrounding the First World War and his focus on other
37 Hermann Cremer, Biblico-Theological Lexicon of New Testament Greek,
trans. William Urwick (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1895), p. iv. One could
rightly ask if Cremer cited Schleiermacher’s phrase ‘die sprachbildende Kraft
des Christenthums’ appropriately (see below, n. 50).
38 Adolf Deissmann, Bibelstudien: Beitra¨ge, zumeist aus den Papyri und
Inschriften, zur Geschichte der Sprache, des Schrifttums und der Religion des
hellenistischen Judentums und des Urchristentums (Marburg: Elwert, 1895);
idem, Neue Bibelstudien: Sprachgeschichtliche Beitra¨ge, zumeist aus den Papyri
und Inschriften, zur Erkla¨rung des Neuen Testaments (Marburg: Elwert, 1897).
Both studies appeared in English translation as Bible Studies: Contributions
Chiefly from Papyri and Inscriptions to the History of the Language, the
Literature, and the Religion of Hellenistic Judaism and Primitive Christianity,
trans. Alexander Grieve (1901) (2nd edn.; Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1909).
39 Daniel B. Wallace, Greek Grammar beyond the Basics: An Exegetical
Syntax of the New Testament (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1996), p. 18.
40 Adolf Deissmann, ‘Adolf Deissmann’, in Die Religionswissenschaft der
Gegenwart in Selbstdarstellungen, ed. E. Stange (Leipzig: Meiner, 1925),
pp. 42–78, at 62.
41 Ibid., pp. 53–4; cf. Albrecht Gerber, Deissmann the Philologist (BZAW
171; Berlin and New York: de Gruyter, 2010), p. 27.
42 Expressed, for instance, in Deissmann, Neue Bibelstudien, p. vii.
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academic and church-political matters.43 Deissmann viewed very
critically the publication of Erwin Preuschen’s Handwo¨rterbuch—
‘a great and painful disappointment’44—though years later he
applauded the third edition of Walter Bauer’s reworking of
Preuschen’s lexicon from 1936 as ‘a most gratifying event in
the realm of both the academy and the church’.45
However, although Bauer significantly improved Preuschen’s
work in accordance with Deissmann’s philological principles and
incorporated new documentary evidence, ‘the semantic content
of the underlying work of Preuschen was preserved with little
modification’.46 This is also true for the entry on the verb
diakr0nesqai. Bauer took over almost literally Preuschen’s entry
and he even adds that the meaning ‘to doubt etc.’ is only docu-
mented from New Testament times onwards.47
In sum, the ‘philological perplexity’ concerning diakr0nesqai
results from (1) the postulate that diakr0nesqai takes on a ‘special
New Testament meaning’ not found in contemporary texts, i.e.
that it is a ‘product of Greek-speaking Christianity’48; (2) the
alternative attempt that derives the meaning ‘to doubt’ from a
hypothetical ‘semantic development of Greek popular speech in
New Testament times’;49 (3) the assumption that this new,
unprecedented, and unparalleled meaning occurs not only in
one of the New Testament authors, but across the New
Testament, in diVerent genres and in a variety of contexts
(Matt. 21:21; Mark 11:23; Acts 10:20; Rom. 4:20; 14:23; Jas
1:6; Jude 20–2)—even though at least one common term for
this phenomenon would have been at hand: dist0zein (cf. Matt.
14:31; 28:17).
43 Cf. Gerber, Deissmann, pp. 91–103.
44 Thus in the review of the first fascicle (quoted in Gerber, Deissmann,
p. 93).
45 Quoted in Gerber, Deissmann, p. 100.
46 John A. L. Lee, A History of New Testament Lexicography (Studies in
Biblical Greek; New York: Lang, 2003) p. 151.
47 Erwin Preuschen and Walter Bauer, Griechisch-Deutsches Wo¨rterbuch zu
den Schriften des Neuen Testaments und der u¨brigen urchristlichen Literatur
(2nd edn.; Giessen: To¨pelmann, 1928), p. 289 (‘in dies[er] Bedeut[un]g erst
seit d[em] NT nachweisbar’). This might go back to Joseph H. Thayer, A
Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament: Being Grimm’s Wilke’s Clavis
Novi Testamenti (corrected edn.; New York: Harper & Brothers, 1889),
p. 138 (‘in a sense not found in prof[ane] auth[ors]’).
48 Bu¨chsel, ‘kr0nw ktl.’, p. 950. For a more recent version of this theory, see
Robert Jewett, Romans: A Commentary (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 2007),
p. 337 (on Rom. 4:20): ‘The verb diakr0nw appears here with the distinctively
early Christian connotation of doubt in a matter of faith.’
49 Gerhard Dautzenberg, Art. ‘diakr0nw’, EWNT 3, cols. 732–8, at 734.
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To be sure, Deissmann himself maintained that the authors of
the New Testament writings do testify to unique word meanings
and specific semantic developments:
It is of course true that the language of the early Christians contained
a series of religious terms peculiar to itself, some of which it formed
for the first time, while others were raised from among expressions
already in use to the status of technical terms. But this phenomenon
must not be limited to Christianity: it manifests itself in all new
movements of civilization (Kulturbewegungen). The representatives of
any peculiar opinions are constantly enriching the language with spe-
cial conceptions (individuelle BegriVe).50
Furthermore, it is also true that in later centuries the meaning
‘to doubt’ for diakr0nesqai is attested: ‘The first Greek lexicon
that lists the particular meaning ‘‘2mßib0llei’’ for diakr0nomai is
authored by Photius [Constantinopolitanus] (9th century CE).’
His entry for diakr0netai lists as synonyms: 2mßib0llei, 2piste8,
and diacwr0zetai.51 The question therefore is: did the Christian
‘movement of civilization’ forge or adopt a ‘special conception’ of
diakr0nesqai at its very beginning or is it more plausible that the
early Christian use of diakr0nesqai reflects the common linguistic
usage of that time?
2.2. No ‘Special Meaning’
Eventually, it has been merely a matter of time that scholars
cast doubt on the common etymological and semantic explana-
tions that propagate a ‘semantic shift’ or ‘semantic development’
in the texts of the New Testament. A small number of alterna-
tive approaches, therefore, refrain from postulating this hypoth-
esis and attempt to explain the relevant passages within the
paradigm of the classical/Hellenistic categories of meaning.52
50 Deissmann, Bible Studies, p. 65 note 1 ¼ Bibelstudien, p. 59 note. This is
actually the context of Schleiermacher’s phrase ‘die sprachbildende Kraft des
Christenthums’: ‘Jede geistige Revolution ist sprachbildend, denn es entstehen
Gedanken und reale Verha¨ltnisse, welche eben als neue durch die Sprache, wie
sie war, nicht bezeichnet werden ko¨nnen.’ (F. D. E. Schleiermacher,
Hermeneutik und Kritik, ed. M. Frank [Suhrkamp Taschenbuch
Wissenschaft, 211; Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1977], p. 115).
51 Spitaler ‘Diakr0nesqai’, p. 7, n. 20, referring to the edition of Christos
Theodoridis, Photii Patriarchae Lexicon, vol. 1: A—D (Berlin and New York:
de Gruyter, 1982). On 2mßib0llein see however below, n. 61.
52 See Norbert Baumert, ‘Das paulinische Wortspiel mit krin-’, Filologı´a
neotestamentaria 15 (2002), pp. 19–64; David DeGraaf, ‘Some Doubts about
Doubt: The New Testament Use of Diakr0nw ’, JETS 48 (2005), pp. 733–55;
Peter Spitaler, ‘Doubt or Dispute (Jude 9 and 22–23): Rereading a Special
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In a series of articles Peter Spitaler ascribes the alleged
‘semantic shift’ not to a specific New Testament development
of the verb diakr0nesqai, but regards it as a product of a process
of translation and interpretation setting in with Origen and
Chrysostom. ‘Origen and Chrysostom see a relationship between
the words doubt and dispute although neither author interprets
one word (i.e. doubt or dispute) to have the same meaning as the
other.’ Spitaler concludes his essay—programmatically subtitled
‘the ‘‘Semantic Shift’’ that Went Unnoticed by Patristic
Authors’—
with the recommendation that the common Greek language system be
observed insofar as the rendering of diakr0nomai in NT passages (both
inside and outside of the NT) is concerned. For a special NT mean-
ing of this verb to be valid, each literary context needs to reveal that
its author has expanded the middle voice’s horizon of meaning. This
can be shown to have occurred with the help of negative proof, i.e. if
none of the traditional meanings of the middle voice suYciently
explains the clause containing the middle, it is reasonable to posit a
modification of meaning. Cross-referencing NT passages does not
prove a genuine semantic development. If both the clause containing
diakr0nomai and the literary context within which the clause is
embedded support a traditional meaning of the verb, an argument
for a semantic shift is without merit; a rendering of the verb accord-
ing to classical/Hellenistic Greek conventions needs to be pursued.53
In my opinion it is indeed illuminating to follow the path
prepared by Spitaler and consult interpreters of the Early
Church in order to utilize their original Sprachgefu¨hl and linguis-
tic competence. But I will amplify his approach by adding two
other interpreters whose exegesis appears to be sensitive to the
relevant philological and lexicographical issues and who do not
subscribe uncritically to the interpretative convention. It seems
to me that the insights of John Chrysostom, John Calvin, and
Markus Barth are capable of shedding new light on this key text
in Romans and also on the profound question about ‘faith’ and
its antagonist. Their approaches all deserve attention on their
own account, but furthermore, I believe it is possible to demon-
strate that they build upon each other and thus aVord a
New Testament Meaning through the Lens of Internal Evidence’, Biblica 87
(2006), pp. 201–22; idem, ‘Diakr0nesqai’; idem, ‘‘‘Doubting’’ in Acts 10:20?’
Filologı´a neotestamentaria 20 (2007), pp. 81–94; idem, ‘James 1:5–6, a Dispute
with God’, CBQ 71 (2009), pp. 560–79. See also the older article by F. C.
Synge, ‘Not Doubt, but Discriminate’, ExpTim 89 (1978), pp. 203–5.
53 Spitaler, ‘Diakr0nesqai’, pp. 39.
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remarkable insight into the history of interpretation of a parti-
cular phrase of Paul’s letter. On the basis of the comments of
Chrysostom, Calvin, and Barth, my own tentative approach to
the meaning of diakr0nesqai in Rom. 4:20 will be presented at the
end.54
2.3. An Exegesis of Romans 4:20
2.3.1. John Chrysostom
Not long after his death in the year AD 407, Chrysostom’s
exegesis of Paul has already been hailed as unsurpassable. The
fifth-century Egyptian ascetic monk Isidore of Pelusium
remarked that ‘if the divine Paul had taken up the Attic
tongue to interpret himself, he would not have done it diVerently
than this renowned man has done’.55 Even contemporary scho-
larship shows utmost respect for the philological, exegetical, but
also pastoral impulses and insights contained in Chrysostom’s
treatises and homilies. Margaret Mitchell says: ‘As a rhetorically
trained, Greek-speaking Syrian, . . . Chrysostom knew intimately
well the literary culture in which Paul was situated. Therefore,
his abundant comments on Paul’s rhetorical proficiency and
crudities are of paramount importance for current research into
the rhetoric of Paul’s epistles.’ She adds, however, that ‘these
statements need to be subjected to a careful analysis in the
light of Chrysostom’s own rhetorical purposes and goals, some-
thing which has been insuYciently attended to in the appropria-
tion of Chrysostom into contemporary New Testament
scholarship on a range of exegetical and philological issues’.56
Precisely his exposition of Abraham’s faith, which figures in
several places,57 illustrates both the accurate philological and the
pragmatic character of his exegetical eVorts. In spite of the dif-
ferent emphases displayed in Chrysostom’s comments on Rom.
4:20, his main objective is quite clear: ‘Chrysostom expressed
deep concern about a widespread tendency to meddle (peri-
erg0zesqai, polupragmone8n) in forbidden knowledge of the
divine nature. For Chrysostom, pistis alone protected against
such prying curiosity because it set boundaries without which
54 The case of Rom. 14:23 is to be dealt with separately.
55 Margaret Mitchell, The Heavenly Trumpet: John Chrysostom and the Art
of Pauline Interpretation (HUT 40; Tu¨bingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2000 and
Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox, 2002), p. 31.
56 Ibid., p. 30.
57 Chrysostom’s interpretations of Rom. 4:20 and the verb diakr0nesqai are,
for the most part, gathered and evaluated in Spitaler, ‘Diakr0nesqai’, pp. 23–6.
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an investigation could easily degenerate into an infinite regress of
questions and responses.’58
In his ninth homily to Paul’s letter to the Romans59
Chrysostom praises the faith of Abraham, who believed ‘against
the hope of man in the hope of God’. Paul’s words that ‘No
distrust made him waver concerning the promise of God’,
Chrysostom explains in terms of the opposition between a
human and a divine viewpoint:
God did not give a proof (2p0deixi") nor did he make a sign (shme8on),
but there were only bare words (r&–mata  il0) promising such things
that nature did not promise. Yet still he says, O2 diekr0qh. He does
not say, ‘He did not disbelieve’, but, O2 diekr0qh, that is, he did not
dither back and forth (o2de; 2nedo0asen)60 and he did not reverse his
position (o2de; 2mße#bale)61 though the hindrances were so great. From
this we learn, that if God promises even countless impossibilities, and
he that hears does not receive them, it is not the nature of things that
is to blame, but the unreasonableness (4noia) of him who receives
them (sc. the promised impossibilities) not.
Chrysostom’s primary focus is not a potentially doubtful, hesi-
tant, or questioning inward reflection about God’s words, which
grapples (intellectually) with the impossibility of the promised
58 Richard Lim, Public Disputation, Power, and Social Order in Late
Antiquity (The Transformation of the Classical Heritage, 23; Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1995), p. 174 (also cited in Spitaler,
‘Diakr0nesqai’, p. 16, n. 44).
59 Text in PG 60, 461 (in PG this homily is numbered as the eighth homily,
but most German and English translations count the introduction as first
homily). The English translation follows Saint Chrysostom: Homilies on the
Acts of the Apostles and the Epistle to the Romans, trans. J. Walker, J.
Sheppard, and H. Browne, rev. George B. Stevens, vol. 1/11 of A Select
Library of the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church, ed.
P. SchaV (BuValo, NY: Christian Literature, 1889).
60 From doi0" ‘twofold’, ‘double’, ‘two’.
61 In biblical usage (LXX and NT) 2mßib0llein means to ‘cast, a t.t. for the
throwing out of the circular casting-net’ (BDAG, p. 54) (Hab. 1:17; Mark 1:16;
cf. Isa. 19:8). According to a number of dictionaries, already Aristotle, Ethica
Eudemia 1243a12.25 used this verb with the meaning ‘to doubt’ (cf. Stefan
Lorenz, Art. ‘Zweifel’, Historisches Wo¨rterbuch der Philosophie 12, pp. 1520–7,
at 1520) or ‘to be doubtful’ (LSJ, pp. 89–90). However, whereas the text in
1243a12 itself is indeed doubtful, the context in 1243a25 rather suggests some-
thing like a change or reversal of one’s position. Cf. Harris Rackham, The
Athenian Constitution. The Eudemian Ethics. On Virtues and Vices (LCL 285;
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1935), p. 425: ‘the position is
reversed (2mßib0llei)’; the German translation by Franz Dirlmeier has: ‘den
Standpunkt wechseln’ (Eudemische Ethik [4th edn.; Berlin: Akademie-Verlag,
1984], pp. 86–7). This meaning makes good sense in the context of
Chrysostom’s homily.
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things, but rather a potentially foolish and disrespectful reaction
to God’s words, which impairs the integrity of one’s relationship
with God. This focus becomes even more evident in the follow-
ing, when Chrysostom describes what Abraham did: He ‘gave
glory to God; and was fully persuaded that, what he had pro-
mised, he was able also to perform’. Chrysostom’s explanation of
this passage features the already mentioned motif that charac-
terizes and specifies his perception of what it means not to dither
back and forth and not to reverse one’s position: it is a whole-
hearted and unconditional devotion to God, which is not indul-
ging in curious questionings (periergaz0menoi ka1 zhtoAnte") and
which is not overcurious (polupragmonoAnte") in matters of the
mysteria divinitatis. For, such insolence (3br0zonte") will cause
utmost suVering.
The ideas of curious questioning and immoral meddling with
which Chrysostom illustrates Abraham’s attitude permeate vir-
tually all of his writings and can be found in a number of dif-
ferent contexts. In all these passages he warns his readers not to
deal with the divine in a sinful manner by not accepting their
human confinements. Generally,
[t]he verb perierg0zesqai and the verb polupragmone8n constitute a
couple that is rarely disjoined. The two composite forms of these
two words only diVer in their prefix—the one underlining the multi-
plicity of the questions asked, . . . the other the multiple variations of
approaching a subject-matter . . . Both, however, share a pejorative
overtone, for this activity is entirely in vain—its object is beyond
human understanding.62
Once he remarks that ‘if God reveals things that may not be
questioned (6 m1 de8 polupragmone8sqai), such things need to be
accepted in faith. Meddling (perierg0zesqai) in the causes of
these revelations and investigating (2paite8n) their claim to
truth and scrutinizing (2pizhte8n) their realization—this is the
work of a shameless and reckless soul.’63
62 Jean Chrysostome. Sur l’incompre´hensibilite´ de Dieu. Home´lies I–V, text,
apparatus, and notes by Anne-Marie Malingrey, trans. Robert Flacelie`re, intro-
duction by Jean Danie´lou (SC 28; 2nd edn.; Paris: Cerf, 1970), p. 129, n. 5
(on De incomprehensibili natura Dei 1.322). Cf. p. 148, n. 2 (on De incompre-
hensibili natura Dei 2.76–7, in the context of which [2.53–148] Zacharias is
compared to the Anhomeans, who seek to explore the mystery of Christ’s
birth (2.141): ‘On retrouve dans ce passage le the`me majeur des home´lies:
opposition entre l’enqueˆte qui se meˆle de ce qui ne la regarde pas:
polupragmone8n ou la curiosite´ indiscre`te: perierg0zesqai et la foi: p0sti".’ See
further the index on pp. 354–5 s.v. perierg0zomai and polupragmonŒw.
63 De incomprehensibili natura Dei 2.77–9 (SC 28, pp. 148–9).
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All this sheds light on Chrysostom’s understanding of the
enigmatic verb diakr0nesqai: wholehearted faith is not impressed
with human limitations since it is directed to the one who
gives and fulfils the promise; on the other hand it does accept
human limitations as it does not meddle in God’s aVairs and
does not with a bumptious attitude oppose God. To be sure,
Chrysostom’s exegesis without doubt serves his ‘own rhetorical
purposes and goals’64—if Abraham lived in our days he would
not be overcurious in the matter of the Lord’s birth as the
Anhomeans are65—but the ‘philological’ aspect does not seem
to be aVected by his apparent pedagogical or church political
application. Rather, his understanding of diakr0nesqai based on
his profound knowledge of Paul’s literary milieu constitutes the
premise of his own rhetorical purpose.
2.3.2. John Calvin
John Calvin’s thinking, too, is shaped by a specifically ecclesial
impetus. He pushes for a reform of the church and is at the same
time deeply rooted in the theological tradition of the early
church. His scriptural exposition is
decisively influenced from the ‘Christian humanism’ at the beginning
of the sixteenth century. Already in Paris he becomes acquainted with
the ideals of ‘Bible humanism’ and begins himself to explain the Bible
based on the biblical languages . . . To a great degree he took over the
philological and text-critical insights of Erasmus.66
The first edition of his commentary on Paul’s letter to the
Romans was published in 1540,67 i.e. not long after the second
edition of his Institutio. ‘All of his writings betray the growing
influence of patristic literature within Calvin’s theology.’68 Calvin
was in possession of Chrysostom’s opera omnia in Latin,69 which
64 Mitchell, The Heavenly Trumpet, p. 30.
65 Cf. Lim, Public Disputation, pp. 172–3.
66 Karl-Heinz zur Mu¨hlen, ‘Der BegriV ‘‘sensus’’ in der Exegese der
Reformationszeit’ (1996), in Reformatorische Pra¨gungen: Studien zur Theologie
Martin Luthers und zur Reformationszeit, ed. A. Lexutt and V. Ortmann
(Go¨ttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2011), pp. 96–110, at 110.
67 Revised editions appeared in 1551 and 1556.
68 Alexandre Ganoczy and Klaus Mu¨ller, Calvins handschriftliche Annotatio-
nen zu Chrysostomus: Ein Beitrag zur Hermeneutik Calvins (Vero¨Ventlichungen
des Instituts fu¨r Europa¨ische Geschichte Mainz, 102; Wiesbaden: Steiner,
1981), p. 25.
69 Calvin used Claude Chevallon’s edition of the Opera omnia (1536)
(cf. Ganoczy and Mu¨ller, Calvins handschriftliche Annotationen, pp. 4–17). Cf.
the list of the (collected) works of the Church Fathers used by Calvin in
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he annotated in the manner of the Erasmian reading instructions
(underlining, marking, commenting).70 Apart from Augustine, it
was Chrysostom who most strongly inspired Calvin’s own think-
ing.71 In matters of exegesis, though, Calvin relied much more
on the judgement of Chrysostom: ‘Calvin’s almost unqualified
respect for Augustine’s authority in dogmatic matters is not par-
alleled in the exegetical realm. Here it is Chrysostom who was
Calvin’s hero, at least for the New Testament. Augustine’s exeg-
esis is severely criticized. He was too subtle, passing over the
plain sense of Scripture and indulging in vain speculations.’72 He
calls Chrysostom the ‘most excellent [interpreter] of all’.73
If we consult his private copy of Chrysostom’s homily on
Romans we find but one mark (and none on Romans 4). Does
this imply that Calvin was not aware of his favourite exegete’s
comments? First, we have to consider that Calvin studied various
collections of Chrysostom’s works and also used other sources
that contained excerpts and quotations of his texts74 so that his
acquaintance with the Church Father and with his exegetical
world of thought was far from fleeting. Second, the excellent
knowledge of, and respect for, Chrysostom suggests that his
insights left their mark on Calvin’s commentary on Romans,
the more so as it was precisely this Pauline letter that decisively
shaped Calvin’s theological formation. Third, there are a number
of clues that suggest an echo of the Church Father in Calvin’s
comments on Rom. 4:20. For instance, Calvin has evidently read
Chrysostom’s homilies on Genesis very closely. Among the 90
underlined passages75 there is one that warns not to meddle in
Anthony N. S. Lane, John Calvin: Student of the Church Fathers (Edinburgh:
T & T Clark, 1999), pp. 11–12.
70 Cf. Gilbert Heß, ‘Formen der Validierung in fru¨hneuzeitlichen Florile-
gien’, in M. L. Allemeyer, K. Behrens and K. U. Mersch (eds.), Eule oder
Nachtigall? Tendenzen und Perspektiven kulturwissenschaftlicher Werteforschung
(Go¨ttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2007), pp. 73–103, at 76 with n. 12.
71 See on Calvin’s use of the Church Fathers the comprehensive study by
Johannes van Oort, ‘John Calvin and the Church Fathers’, in I. Backus (ed.),
The Reception of the Church Fathers in the West: From the Carolingians to the
Maurists (Leiden: Brill, 1997), vol. 1, pp. 661–700.
72 Cf. Lane, John Calvin, p. 39. Further David C. Steinmetz, ‘Calvin and
the Patristic Exegesis of Paul’, in idem (ed.), The Bible in the Sixteenth Century
(Duke Monographs in Medieval and Renaissance Studies, 11; Durham, NC:
Duke University Press, 1990), pp. 100–18, 231–5.
73 CR 37, col. 834 (‘Chrysostomum ex omnibus potissimum delegerim’).
74 Cf. Ganoczy and Mu¨ller, Calvins handschriftliche Annotationen, p. 24 (e.g.
Peter Lombard, Libri Quattuor Sententiarum; Philipp Melanchthon, Loci
Communes).
75 Ganoczy and Mu¨ller, Calvins handschriftliche Annotationen, p. 18.
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divine aVairs by saying: ‘Why did God create this and that?’;76
and another one that recommends not to inquire into the place of
Enoch’s rapture, but simply to believe what is being said.77
Needless to say that the assumption of a factual theological
agreement between Calvin and Chrysostom, and even of a pos-
sible dependence of Calvin on the Church Father, should not
belittle Calvin’s own philological and exegetical skills.78 In his
own commentary on Romans, Calvin explains that Abraham
‘neither vacillated nor fluctuated (non vacillasse, aut fluctuatum
esse) as we usually do in ambiguous circumstances’. Then he
oVers an illuminating explanation of the phrase o2 diekr0qh:
unlike the Vulgate, he does not use the word ‘haesitare’, but
translates: ‘non disquisivit’79 and explains his decision:
Though I do not follow the old version, nor Erasmus,80 yet my
rendering is not given without reason. The Apostle seems to have
had this in view—That Abraham did not try to find out, by weighing
the matter in the balance of unbelief, whether the Lord was able to
perform what he had promised. What is properly to inquire or to
search into (disquirere) anything, is to examine (excutimus) it through
diYdence, and to be unwilling to admit what appears not credible
(credibile), without thoroughly sifting it.
76 Cf. ibid., p. 56: In Calvin’s edition the Greek pair of words perierg0zesqai
and polupragmone8n is translated as ‘obmurmurare, et curiosius inquirere’. It
continues: ‘et dicere: Quare deus hoc vel illud fecit?’ Calvin marked the entire
passage and underlined the preceding sentence: ‘Alia enim propter nostram
utilitatem fecit, alia propter suam magnificentiam.’
77 Cf. ibid., p. 81: Calvin underlined the sentence: ‘Iam si quis curiosius
rogare [perierg0zesqai] velit et dicere: et quo ipsum [sc. Enoch] transtulit?’ The
following is marked; it says inter alia: ‘discat, non convenire humanis mentibus
curiosius ea quae a deo fiunt explorare [polupragmone8n], sed credere his quae
dicuntur’.
78 Despite his reverence for the Church Father, Calvin also criticized a
number of his comments (cf. ibid., p. 21 with examples).
79 The Latin text of the third edition (1556) is found in Iohannis Calvini
Commentarius in epistolam Pauli ad Romanos, ed. T. H. L. Parker (Studies in
the History of Christian Thought, 22; Leiden: Brill, 1981). The English trans-
lation follows that of John Owen (Calvin’s Commentaries: Romans, ed. and
trans. John Owen [Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1947]).
80 See the note in Parker, Iohannis Calvini Commentarius, p. 96, n. 60:
‘Eras[mus] L[atin New Testament]1–5: verum ad promissionem dei non haesi-
tabat incredulitate; Eras[mi] Ann[otationes]1–5: id est, Non diiudicavit aut
disquisivit quod est diYdentis . . . —Vg: in repromissione etiam Dei non haesi-
tavit diYdentia.’ (Notably, Calvin only deviates from Erasmus’ Novum
Testamentum, but not from his Annotationes, as they too have ‘disquirere’ for
diakr0nesqai.)
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To be sure, Calvin is well aware of the discrepancy between his
exposition and Abraham’s laughter in view of the promise (Gen.
17:17), but he regards Abraham’s reaction—unlike Sara’s (Gen.
18:12–15)81—as an ‘expression of wonder’.82 Abraham ‘indeed
asked, how it could come to pass, but that was the asking of
one astonished; as the case was with the virgin Mary, when she
inquired of the angel how could that be which he had
announced; and there are other similar instances’.
Calvin’s exegesis reaches its Reformation peak when he
explains
that no greater honour can be given to God, than by faith to seal his
truth; as, on the other hand, no greater dishonour can be done to
him, than to refuse his oVered favour, or to discredit his word. It is
hence the chief thing in honouring God, obediently to embrace his
promises: and true religion begins with faith (Veraque religio a fide
incipit).
According to Calvin, therefore, Abraham did not scrutinize in
a distrustful attitude God’s promise. He did not oVend God with
conceited questions and insubordinate examinations.
2.3.3. Markus Barth
The reformed theologian Markus Barth (the oldest son of Karl
Barth) arguably held John Calvin in high esteem and made
extensive use of his exegetical insights.83 In the congress
volume that documents the already mentioned paper by
Joachim Jeremias on Romans 4, we find a remarkable response
of Markus Barth to Jeremias, probably formulated ad hoc in the
course of the discussion. The line of thought of this response
could well be inspired by Calvin’s expositions (though Calvin is
not cited in this context), yet it incorporates some lexicographi-
cal observations and places the Abraham scene into the setting of
a law court, thus adding a juridical accent. At first Barth
insists—not without some irony—that he considers Jeremias’s
explanation to be a ‘classical account in the line from
Augustine to Luther and to all honest confessors, not only of
81 In contrast to Abraham, Sara’s laughter has been reproached: ‘[A] similar
laughter and inquiry on the part of Sarah were not without reproof, because
she regarded not the promise as valid.’
82 Similarly Philo, Quaest. 3.55 (cf. Douglas J. Moo, A Commentary on the
Epistle to the Romans [NICNT; Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1996], p. 285).
83 Cf. e.g. the abundant references to Calvin in his two-volume commentary
on Ephesians (Markus Barth, Ephesians, 2 vols. [AB 34; Garden City, NY:
Doubleday, 1974]).
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the Reformation but also among Catholics’.84 His criticism sets
in where he recognizes an understanding of faith as a ‘disposition
of the  uc–’ the opposite of which is doubt.85 The Old
Testament, he argues, does not have a word for ‘doubt’, but
expresses the opposite of faith, of ‘being firm’ or ‘fastening one-
self’ by means of the idea of ‘wavering’ or ‘fluctuating’
(‘Schwanken’ and ‘Wanken’).86
If in Romans 4 doubt is the opposite of faith, this would imply an
innovation of Paul which would not correspond to his exposition of
the nature of faith by means of Abraham and Old Testament texts! If
Paul argues on the basis of the Old Testament, and if indeed he is a
reasonably good exegete, he has to argue in line with the Old
Testament. If, however, he introduces something new such as the
Greek concept of doubt over against the certainty of faith, then he
factually abuses the Old Testament.87
Barth adds an etymological aspect: ‘Diakr0nomai does not contain
the root ‘‘two’’ ’—like ‘zweifeln’, ‘douter’, or ‘to doubt’—but
‘etymologically it says: ‘‘here is someone who pronounces a jud-
gement’’ and ‘‘here is someone who gives a response’’—indeed a
negative response, which rebukes someone else’s judgement to
his own detriment.’88
Paul is best understood, according to Barth, if one translates:
Abraham
would have acted up as opposing judge (Gegenrichter) against God’s
promise if he had not believed, or: he did not challenge God like a
know-it-all (Besserwisser). This would stretch beyond the psychology
of doubt and lead back to the situation of judgement [of Romans
3] . . . : Here is God with his promise and the question: How are we
responding? Do we say: I accept this promise as right?89
Later, Barth picks up this thought and recapitulates his objec-
tions against the traditional understanding: ‘The opposite of
faith is to not accept God’s judgement or juridical order, to
not live from it, but to think that one knows it all. Hence, I
would say: this kind of contradiction, this acting up as an
84 Markus Barth, in Jeremias, ‘Die Gedankenfu¨hrung in Ro¨m 4’, p. 59.
85 Ibid.
86 Ibid., pp. 59–60.
87 Ibid., p. 60.
88 Ibid.
89 Ibid.
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opposing judge, is diVerent from doubting and saying: ‘‘Should I
accept it or should I not?’’ It is active resistance against God.’90
Thus, according to Barth’s line of thought, Abraham did not go
up against God by claiming superior knowledge, and he did not
oppose God by questioning and seeking to overturn his decree.
2.4. Interpretative Suggestions
The exegesis of Chrysostom, Calvin, and Barth confirms that
it is indeed possible to understand diakr0nesqai in Rom. 4:20
within the classical/Hellenistic semantic paradigm. It is not
necessary to appeal to the generative power of the gospel, to
posit a semantic shift in the New Testament, or to postulate a
semantic development in contemporary Greek popular speech.
This observation is even more significant than the intriguing
question whether or not these three commentators are ‘genealo-
gically’ linked. Chrysostom connects this verb with the act of
curious questioning and immoral meddling in divine aVairs,
Calvin understands it as inquiring into the promise and only
accepting those things that appear credible upon a thorough
examination, and Barth finally insists that it stands for acting
up as a Gegenrichter against God’s promise, indeed as ‘active
resistance against God’.
Explicitly or not, their interpretations all refrain from limiting
the semantics of diakr0nesqai to an intrapersonal conflict or divi-
siveness, or to the ‘two-ness’ of one’s heart or mind. Meddling,
inquisitiveness, and rebellion are not the same as the mental
disposition of indecisiveness. They are not the same as the
notion of ‘contending or disputing with oneself ’,91 of ‘being
undecided within oneself ’,92 or of ‘being divided against one-
self’,93 as the dictionaries imply. They are not the same as ‘hes-
itating’ (Vulgate) or ‘staggering’ (KJV) or ‘wavering’ (NRSV,
ESV, NAS, etc.), as the translations suggest. Finally, they are
not the same as ‘being undeterred’,94 as adapting an ‘attitude
of distrust and inconsistency in relationship to God and
90 Ibid., p. 65.
91 Bauer, Wo¨rterbuch, p. 370. This and the following two references are
found in Spitaler, ‘Diakr0nesqai’, p. 4, nn. 7 and 8.
92 Cf. Timothy Friberg, Barbara Friberg, and Neva F. Miller, Analytical
Lexicon of the Greek New Testament (Baker’s Greek NT Library; Grand
Rapids, MI: Baker, 2000), p. 110.
93 Cf. James Hope Moulton and George Milligan, The Vocabulary of the
Greek New Testament Illustrated from the Papyri and other Non-Literary Sources
(London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1914–29), p. 150.
94 Jeremias, ‘Die Gedankenfu¨hrung in Ro¨m 4’, p. 57.
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his promises’95 or as experiencing ‘weakness in faith’,96 as many
commentaries contend.
Is it at all something that can be labelled ‘doubt’?
2.4.1. Abraham’s Faith
My own suggestion starts from the antonym of diakr0nesqai
that occurs in Rom. 4:20, namely p0sti" (and piste0ein). On the
one hand, in Rom. 4:18–21(22), Paul explores Abraham’s modus
fidei from its beginning as response to God’s promise to the
desolation of its non-fulfilment. Since Paul extracts and selects
the motifs of his presentation from the Old Testament story,97
the result is not an a-historical, abstract definition of faith, but a
description of faith bound to Abraham’s biography.98 On the
other hand, on the basis of Abraham’s biography, Paul creates
a comprehensive theologia fidei, as Abraham’s faith typologically
prefigures Christian faith.99 When Paul quotes Gen. 15:6a, ‘and
Abraham believed (2p0steusen)’, he has in mind the act of coming
to faith, his transition from the sphere of unbelief (2pist0a, cf.
Rom. 3:3) and ungodliness (2sŒbeia, cf. Rom. 4:5) to the sphere
of faith, his first encounter with the reality of faith.100 The aorist
2p0steusen is an ingressive aorist.101 Abraham remained in the
dominion of ungodliness as long as faith did not govern his
life, as long as he did not live under the domain of faith.
95 Moo, Epistle to the Romans, p. 285.
96 Cf. Ulrich Wilckens, Der Brief an die Ro¨mer, vol. 1: Ro¨m 1–5 (EKK 6/1;
Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener, 1978), p. 276, n. 896: ‘m1 diakrin0meno" tI
2pist0G entspricht m1 2sqen0sa" tI p0stei’; Rudolf Bultmann, Art. ‘piste0w ktl.
A, C, D’, TWNT 6, pp. 174–82, 197–230, at 207; Ernst Ka¨semann, An die
Ro¨mer (HNT 8a; 4th edn.; Tu¨bingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1980), p. 118.
97 Such ‘selective and dramatic retelling of biblical stories was quite
common in Jewish literature of this period’ (Thomas H. Tobin, ‘What Shall
We Say that Abraham Found? The Controversy behind Romans 4’, HTR 88
[1995], pp. 437–52, at 449, listing passages from Jubilees, Philo, and Josephus).
98 Cf. Jeremias, ‘Die Gedankenfu¨hrung in Ro¨m 4’, p. 55.
99 Cf. Ernst Ka¨semann, ‘Der Glaube Abrahams in Ro¨m 4’, in Paulinische
Perspektiven (Tu¨bingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1969), pp. 140–77, at 141. See also
Fritz Neugebauer, In Christus ¼ En Christoi: Eine Untersuchung zum pauli-
nischen Glaubenversta¨ndnis (Go¨ttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1961),
p. 168–9: ‘Abraham [ist] der Typus des neuen Gottesvolkes.’
100 Cf. Hermann Binder, Der Glaube bei Paulus (Berlin: Evangelische
Verlagsanstalt, 1968), p. 64.
101 Klaus Haacker lists analogous usages of the aorist of piste0ein (idem, Art.
‘Glaube II/3. Neues Testament’, TRE 13, pp. 277–304, at 297): Acts 2:44
[v.l.]; 4:4, 32; 8:12, 13; 9:42; 11:17, 21; 13:12, 48; 14:1; 15:7; 16:31; 17:12,
34; 18:8; 19:2, 4; Rom. 10:14; 13:11; 1 Cor. 3:5; 15:2, 11; Gal. 2:16; Eph.
1:13; 2 Thess. 1:10; Heb. 4:3; 11:16; 1 John 3:23 (?); Jude 5.
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Paul follows the widespread Jewish tradition that Abraham
turned from paganism to the true God,102 but also seems to
have been aware of a topos in Jewish exegesis according to
which the events reported in Genesis 15 happened prior to
Abraham’s migration from Haran reported in Genesis 12.103
All this implies that Genesis 15 marks, for Paul, the beginning
of Abraham’s journey to, and in, faith.
Paul takes up a thought from the beginning of his letter:104
There, he accuses the Gentiles of ‘ungodliness’ (2sŒbeia) and
‘unrighteousness’ (2dik0a); they suppress the truth of God’s faith-
fulness in ‘unrighteousness’ (2dik0a) (1:18), they show ignorance
towards God the creator and his ‘power’ (d0nami") (1:20; cf. 1:25)
and they refuse to give glory to God (o2c . . . 2d0xasan), even
though they know him (1:21). By contrast, Abraham once and
for all left behind this negative sphere, renounced the neglect of
God, and set oV to a new existence outside of his former
‘milieu’.105 He believed in the one who makes righteous (dikaioAn)
the ‘ungodly’ (2seb–"), clinging to God’s promise and accepting its
truth in faith. He knew that he stood empty-handed before God
and that he was dependent on his generative power (dunat0") (4:21;
cf. 4:17). Thus he gave glory to God (do1" d0xan tJ qeJ) (4:20).
Apparently, there is a clear ‘structural pattern of contrast
between Abraham and the rebellious Gentiles’: ‘Abraham, in his
102 Edward Adams gathers passages from Jewish texts which interpret Gen.
11:27 – 12:9 as Abraham’s rejection of idolatry and turning to the creator God
(Jub. 11.16–17; 12.1–21; Philo, Virt. 211–16; Abr. 68–72; Her. 97–9; Josephus,
Ant. 1.155–6; ApcAbr. 7.10–12) (idem, ‘Abraham’s Faith and Gentile
Disobedience: Textual Links between Romans 1 and 4’, JSNT 65 [1997],
pp. 47–66, at 55–9).
103 This view is inspired by the diVerences of the time spans in Gen. 15:13
(400 years) and Exod. 12:40 (430 years). Paul seems to have been aware of
such Jewish numerical calculations and in particular of the combination of
Gen. 15:13 and Exod. 12:40 (cf. Stefan Kreuzer, ‘‘‘Der den Gottlosen rechtfer-
tigt’’ (Ro¨mer 4,5): Die fru¨hju¨dische Einordnung von Gen 15 als Hintergrund
fu¨r das Abrahambild und die Rechtfertigungslehre des Paulus’, TBei 33
[2002], pp. 208–19, at 218–19): In Gal. 3:17 he relates the 430 years to the
time span between promise and law, i.e., between Abraham and Moses, an
inference which cannot be deduced from Exod. 12:40 alone.
104 This is commonly accepted. Klaus Haacker (Der Brief des Paulus an die
Ro¨mer [THKNT; Leipzig: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 1999], p. 109, n. 111)
refers to the commentaries of C. K. Barrett, C. E. B. Cranfield, James D. G.
Dunn, Joseph A. Fitzmyer, Ernst Ka¨semann, Franz-J. Leenhardt, Douglas J.
Moo, Leon Morris, Anders Nygren, and Ulrich Wilckens.
105 Cf. Kreuzer, ‘‘‘Der den Gottlosen rechtfertigt’’ ’, p. 219.
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trustful response to God, did precisely what the disobedient
Gentiles of Rom. 1.18–32 declined to do.’106
Yet Paul not only contrasts ‘Abraham’s faith and the Gentiles’
failure’,107 but also confronts ‘Jacob’s [i.e. Israel’s] ungodliness’
(cf. 11:26).108 In the passage Rom. 3:1–8, which consists of ‘hard
questions with existential bite for his own faith’109 and which
‘clearly anticipates his lengthy discussion of the enduring validity
of God’s promises to Israel in Romans 9–11’,110 Paul deplores
the ‘faithlessness’ (2pist0a) of ‘some’ Jews, as they dispute the
faithfulness (p0sti") of God (3:3) and stand iniquitously and in
unrighteousness (2dik0a) before him (3:5). In the person of
Abraham this is reverted: through his faith he acknowledges
the truth of God (cf. 3:3: 3 qe1" 2lhq0") and hence subscribes
to LXX Ps. 50:6, which Paul quotes in 3:4: ‘So that you may be
justified (dikaiwqI") in your words, and prevail in your judging
(2n tJ kr0nesqa0 se)’ (Rom. 3:4). This is why Abraham himself is
justified (2log0sqh a2tJ e2" dikaios0nhn) on grounds of his (coming
to) faith (2p0steusen) (4:3).
Paul is quite clear: all have sinned and are apart from God,
both Gentiles and Jews; their ungodliness is, in Paul’s view, not
merely a passive being apart from God, but an active denial of
his godliness. This is precisely what Paul intends to say with the
dative tI 2pist0G in Rom. 4:20. Several commentators such as
Charles Cranfield rightly observe ‘that 2pist0a denotes more than
just the absence of faith: it denotes the active rejection of faith,
the positive refusal to give credence to God’s oVered promise’.111
Mostly, it is argued that ‘tI 2pist0G is probably a relatively rare
example of the causal dative’,112 though few recognize that ‘it
106 Adams, ‘Abraham’s Faith’, pp. 54, 47.
107 Ibid., p. 47.
108 The noun 2sŒbeia occurs twice in Paul: Rom. 1:18 and 11:26, once
denoting Gentile ungodliness, once Israel’s ungodliness (cf. in addition Rom.
4:5; 5:6).
109 James D. G. Dunn, Romans (WBC; Dallas, Texas: Word, 1988), p. 129.
110 Mark A. Seifrid, ‘Unrighteous by Faith: Apostolic Proclamation in
Romans 1:18–3:20’, in Justification and Variegated Nomism, pp. 105–46, at 107.
111 C. E. B. Cranfield, A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Epistle to
the Romans, vol. 1 (ICC; Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1975), p. 248, with refer-
ence to Otto Michel, Der Brief an die Ro¨mer (KEK; 5th edn.; Go¨ttingen:
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1978), p. 173: ‘2pist0a ist mehr als eine Negation
von p0sti": gemeint ist die Absage an den Glauben, der Verzicht auf die
angebotene Verheißung Gottes.’
112 Moo, Epistle to the Romans, p. 284, n. 79; cf. BDR §196.1; Eduard
Lohse, Der Brief an die Ro¨mer (KEK 4, Go¨ttingen: Vandenhoeck &
Ruprecht, 2003), p. 160, n. 7.
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could also be a dative of ‘‘sphere’’ ’.113 I think that a ‘spatial-
dynamic’ thinking is not only at the root of Paul’s ‘in Christ’
terminology, but also of his language of faith: as Christians we
are ‘in faith’ (2 Cor. 13:5), live ‘in faith’ (Gal. 2:20), and stand ‘in
faith’ (Rom. 11:20; 1 Cor. 16:13; 2 Cor. 1:24), just as we are ‘in
Christ’, live ‘in Christ’ (Rom. 6:11), and stand ‘in Christ’ (Phil.
4:1; 1 Thess. 3:8). Faith for Paul not only serves two functions,
‘one individual and one communal’,114 but three: one individual,
one communal, and one salvation-historical. For Paul, p0sti" is
not only a ‘disposition’—individual or corporate—but also a sal-
vation-historical ‘dispensation’, the signature of the new phase of
God’s dealing with humanity, which transforms the conditions of
human existence and which draws human beings into its sphere
of influence (cf. esp. Gal. 3:23–6).115 Its opposite, 2pist0a, stands
for the sphere of ungodliness and depravity, in which God’s
wrath and human sin are eVective. Abraham is described by
Paul as the ‘pre-existent’ or ‘primordial’ member of the realm
of faith, as both typos and example of those who ground their
existence ‘in faith’, of those who are 2k p0stew".116
2.4.2. Abraham and ‘Doubt’
What are the consequences that can be drawn from this ‘spa-
tial-dynamic’—and, as it were, ‘existential-ontological’117—view
of the believing subject with respect to the verb diakr0nesqai? In
this final step, the various argumentative threads presented in the
course of this study are gathered and bound together in terms of
a (tentative) solution to the understanding of diakr0nesqai in
Rom. 4:20.
If it is true that ‘2pist0a denotes more than just the absence of
faith’, but rather an existence apart from the domain of faith,
then diakr0nesqai must be more than ‘an uncertainty of belief or
opinion’ or ‘a lack of confidence’ or ‘an inclination not to believe
113 Moo, Epistle to the Romans, p. 284, n. 79. But see Moo’s translation,
which once again accentuates Abraham’s disposition: ‘he did not waver ‘‘in’’
the attitude of disbelief’.
114 Ben C. Dunson, ‘Faith in Romans: The Salvation of the Individual or
Life in Community?’, JSNT 34 (2011), pp. 19–46, at 22.
115 This understanding of p0sti" ties in with a specific interpretation of the
enigmatic syntagma p0sti" VristoA, which cannot be detailed in this context;
see e.g. Preston Sprinkle, ‘P0sti" VristoA as an Eschatological Event’, in idem
and M. F. Bird (eds.), The Faith of Jesus Christ: Exegetical, Biblical and
Theological Studies (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 2009), pp. 165–84.
116 Cf. Schliesser, Abraham’s Faith, p. 328.
117 Cf. Ingolf U. Dalferth, Die Wirklichkeit des Mo¨glichen: Hermeneutische
Religionsphilosophie (Tu¨bingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2003), p. 420.
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or accept’.118 It must be more than a struggle in the inner life
generated by the contrariety of reality. Rather, if Abraham had
moved from faith toward unbelief, he would have returned to
that stage in his life which he had left behind through his coming
to faith upon God’s promise (4:3); he would have returned into
Gentile ungodliness and unrighteousness (1:18), this negative
sphere that Paul has described in Rom. 1:18–32. Also, he
would have relapsed into the unrighteousness (2pist0a) (3:5)
and ungodliness (11:26) of those ‘Jews’, who oppose God and
his decrees (3:3–4) and do not know about the ‘righteousness of
God’ (10:3).
As mentioned above, Chrysostom expressed his concern about
people who tend to meddle in the mysteries of God’s work and
being and engage in curious questioning and speculations about
God, the creator; such insubordinate audacity is futile and will
bring about God’s punishment. Only faith is able to control
human curiosity and insolence and avert their suVering.
Therefore, only through faith, God is glorified. One passage in
Chrysostom succinctly summarizes his thoughts: ‘glorifying God
is this: always yielding one’s own thinking to what is incompre-
hensible and to the inexpressible power and wisdom, and neither
interfering nor meddling with God’s aVairs nor saying, why this?
for what purpose that? how can this be?’119 This description
reminds us of what the Gentiles of Rom. 1:18–32 are accused
of: They do not glorify God, the creator (1:21), but rather claim
to have wisdom on their own (1:22); they meddle in the divine
ordinances and order of creation by exchanging the truth about
God for a lie (1:25).
Nevertheless, according to Paul they know God’s decree ‘that
those who practise such things deserve to die’ (1:32). I suggest
that Chrysostom’s comments point to a decisive semantic aspect
of diakr0nesqai: When Paul uses this verb he might have had in
mind that Abraham did not act up as a ‘busybody’ or ‘meddler’.
He respected the asymmetrical relation between creature and
creation (cf. Rom. 9:20) and did not interfere with the one,
‘who gives life to the dead and calls into existence the things
that do not exist’ (Rom. 4:17). He did not return to the sphere
of unbelief and ungodliness, but—as Ka¨semann put it—accepted
118 See above, n. 22.
119 Ad eos qui scandalizati sunt 10.7.5–9 (Jean Chrysostome. Sur la providence
de Dieu, ed. and trans. Anne-Marie Malingrey [SC 79; Paris: Cerf, 1961], pp.
52–276; English translation in Spitaler, ‘Diakr0nesqai’, p. 27).
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that God is God120—in short: ‘he did not in a meddlesome atti-
tude argue (with God, the creator) in unbelief (o2 diekr0qh tI
2pist0G)’.
A specific form of meddling with the divine aVairs is entering
into a legal dispute with God, the judge. This is what Markus
Barth is keen to assert. In his view, diakr0nesqai means to refuse
God’s promise, saying: ‘I do not accept God’s word to be true or
right.’ The rejection of the promise is inextricably linked to one’s
own detriment. It seems that Barth builds his argument on his
reading of Rom. 1:18–3:20 in general—a passage which is per-
vaded by forensic language and imagery121—and on Rom. 3:1–8
in particular. In Rom. 3:6 ‘it is obvious that God’s righteousness
as Judge is the fundamental axiom from which Paul moves out
and which he seeks to defend despite the corollaries which might
be drawn from Israel’s unfaithfulness (3.3–6)’.122 Despite, or
rather: Because of Israel’s unfaithfulness to the oracles of God
(Rom. 3:2), he will prevail in his judging (3:4), and all those who
seek to turn God into a liar will have to realise that eventually he
will be found true. At the end of this passage, Paul exclaims:
‘Their condemnation is just!’ (3:8). Barth’s interpretation, there-
fore, draws on another significant nuance of the semantics of
diakr0nesqai in Rom. 4:20. Paul might well have thought of
Abraham as a figure who did not act up as an ‘opposing
judge’. Rather, he accepted the oracles of God in faith and was
therefore reckoned righteous by God. Consequently, ‘he did not
in an insolent manner dispute (with God, the judge) in unbelief
(o2 diekr0qh tI 2pist0G)’.
In sum, the line of argument of the first chapters of Romans
shows that the apostle is less concerned with the psychology of
faith than with the question of how human beings position them-
selves before God. Do they hear and yield to his word or do they
adopt a rebellious and disobedient attitude? Do they live in the
‘sphere of Adam’ or in the ‘sphere of Christ’, as typologically
prefigured by Abraham?123 The recipients of the letter were not
prepared to get a glimpse into the psyche of their forefather—
does it display uncertainty, hesitation, wavering?—but they are
eager to know which side he takes in the face of the provocative
120 Cf. Ka¨semann, Ro¨mer, p. 141.
121 Seifrid, ‘Unrighteous by Faith’, p. 108 with n. 7.
122 James D. G. Dunn, ‘Jesus the Judge: Further Thoughts on Paul’s
Christology and Soteriology’ (2001), in idem, The New Perspective on Paul
(Tu¨bingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2005), pp. 389–407, at 399.
123 Cf. Morna D. Hooker, From Adam to Christ: Essays on Paul (Cambridge
and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 41.
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impossibility of God’s promise: Does he become weak in and fall
oV from faith? Does he move back into the realm of ‘unbelief ’,
separating himself from and arguing with God? Or does he stand
firm in faith, being strengthened by God?
A comparison of Paul’s argumentation with expositions of
contemporaneous and later Jewish sources illustrates the diVer-
ences and commonalities in their approaches. Philo’s Abraham
embodies ‘the best elements of Greek philosophy’,124 strives for
the Hellenistic virtues, and at the same time believes in the
‘Uncreated’ (Virt. 218125), the ‘Existent’ (Abr. 270). Abraham,
‘having gained faith, the most sure and certain of the virtues, he
gained with it all the other virtues’—‘because of his greatness of
soul’ (Virt. 216). One of Philo’s numerous citations and exposi-
tions of Gen. 15:6 is particularly illuminating with respect to the
question of Abraham’s ‘doubt’. Philo links this verse with Gen.
17:17: ‘Then Abraham fell on his face and laughed, and said in
his mind’, expounding on the phrase ‘in his mind (2n tI diano0G
a2toA)’: This addition
is made with very careful purpose. Why so? Because in saying ‘Shall
this happen to one of a hundred years’, he seems to doubt (2ndoi0sai)
the birth of Isaac in which in an earlier place he was said to believe
[sc. Gen. 15:6] . . . So then, since doubt was not consistent with his
past belief, Moses has represented the doubt not as long-lived, or
prolonged to reach the mouth and tongue, but staying where it was
with the swiftly moving mind . . . So then in the case of the virtuous
man the swerving was short, instantaneous and infinitesimal, not
belonging to sense but only to mind, and so to speak timeless.
Philo goes on: The one who argues that Abraham did not have
‘any trace or shadow or breath of unbelief whatsoever’ wishes to
‘make out the created to be uncreated, the mortal immortal, the
perishable imperishable . . . man to be God. Such a person asserts
that the faith which man possesses should be so strong as to
diVer not at all from the faith which belongs to the Existent, a
faith sound and complete in every way’ (Mut. 177–81). Since
Philo understands faith as a di0qesi" of the soul,126 he expends
much exegetical energy in exploring the inner life of the patri-
arch; ‘doubt’ is an aspect that he embarks upon in numerous
other places and with a propensity to detail.127 Obviously, such
124 G. Walter Hansen, Abraham in Galatians: Epistolary and Rhetorical
Contexts (JSNTSup 29; SheYeld: JSOT Press, 1989), p. 190.
125 Trans. Francis H. Colson/George H. Whitaker.
126 Cf. Bultmann, Theology, p. 316.
127 Cf. e.g. Virt. 216; Her. 101; QG 3.2; 3.58; 4.17.
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deliberations about the complexities and nuances of Abraham’s
interior are not in Paul’s focus.
A diVerent perspective on Abraham’s attitude is taken by
those Jewish sources which regard the questions raised by
Abraham in Genesis 15—particularly Gen. 15:8: ‘How shall I
know . . . ?’—as the trigger for divine punishment.128 Those
texts do not adhere to an idealized image of the patriarch, but
rather emphasize the less positive aspects of the biblical text.129
However, they do not focus on the ‘doubt’ of Abraham, but
rather on his conduct towards God and on the manner of his
interaction with God: the Babylonian Talmud quotes an author-
ity called Samuel, who reflects on the question ‘How come our
father Abraham was punished and his children subjugated in
Egypt for two hundred and ten years?’ Samuel responds:
‘Because he exaggerated in testing the traits of the Holy One,
blessed be He: ‘‘And he said, Lord God, how shall I know that I
shall inherit it’’.’130 Several late rabbinic texts explicitly state
that Abraham’s question was a sinful and improper act or an
expression of unbelief. Seder Eliyahu Rabbah argues: ‘A man
should always take care not to yield to the power of sin, and
be it the slightest sin. Come and learn from our forefathers:
They went down to Egypt only because of a slight word which
Abraham spoke: ‘‘How shall I know?’’ ’131 A similar thought
is found in Seder Eliyahu Zuta: ‘Because he said something
128 The sources quoted in the following are gathered in Gu¨nter Stemberger,
‘Gen 15 in Rabbinic and Patristic Interpretation’ (2009), in Judaica Minora,
vol. 1: Biblische Traditionen im rabbinischen Judentum (TSAJ 133; Tu¨bingen:
Mohr Siebeck, 2010), pp. 452–68, at 462–3; Lewis M. Barth, ‘Genesis 15 and
the Problem of Abraham’s Seventh Trial’, Maarav 8 (1992), pp. 245–63, at
258–62.
129 To be sure, witnesses to the opposite procedure, i.e. texts which omit or
suppress the negative aspects of the biblical portrayal of the patriarch, are
more frequent. Interestingly, within this group of writings, some later ones
probably ‘had knowledge of the traditions that speak of Abraham’s fears and
lack of faith. Their decision to avoid problematic verses can be explained as an
example of their determination to build on positive images of Abraham in
biblical and rabbinic traditions’ (Barth, ‘Genesis 15’, p. 262; e.g. Pirqe Rabbi
Eliezer).
130 b. Ned. 32a (trans. Jacob Neusner). Rashi writes in his famous Talmud
commentary on this passage: ‘he thought excessively about the attributes of the
Holy One Blessed be He’ (Marcus Jastrow, A Dictionary of the Targumim, the
Talmud Babli and Yerushalmi, and the Midrashic Literature [New York: Pardes,
1950], p. 1222b). Note the correspondence to Chrysostom’s warnings not to
interfere with God’s sovereignty.
131 S. Eli. Rab. 14 (trans. Meir Friedmann).
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improper, his sons went down to Egypt.’132 Targum Pseudo-
Jonathan claims that the codicil of slavery is a result of
Abraham’s unbelief: ‘Know for certain that your children will
be residents in a land that is not theirs, because you did not
believe, and they will be enslaved and aZicted four hundred
years.’133
These features of the assessment of Abraham’s faith obviously
run directly counter to Paul’s statement that Abraham did not in
a disrespectful manner argue with God (o2 diekr0qh). Gu¨nter
Stemberger maintained that ‘[t]he development of rabbinic inter-
pretation of Gen 15:6.8 may at least to some extent be under-
stood as a reaction to Christian interpretation’. He has in mind
Christian authors such as Ephrem the Syrian, but in my opinion
it is not implausible that one characteristic of Paul’s Abraham
(and not only of the Abraham of Paul’s interpreters) stood before
the eyes of, and was rejected by, those Jewish authors. Notably,
the opposite—‘Pauline’—trait of the Jewish Abraham image is
reflected in the addition to Gen. 15:6 in Targum Pseudo-
Jonathan. This addition is incongruent with the paraphrase of
Gen. 15:13 mentioned above, but strikingly resembles our pro-
posed interpretation of diakr0nesqai: ‘He had faith in the Memra
of the Lord, and he reckoned it to him as merit because he did
not speak rebelliously against him.’134 The Targum’s construal—
later and elsewhere thrown into reverse—seems to be much
closer to Paul than the sophisticated analysis of Abraham’s
inner life in Philo.
3. CONCLUDING REMARKS
At the end of this tour d’horizon we must return to the question
of ‘doubt’. Meddling, inquisitiveness, and rebellion are not the
same as the shapes of doubt illustrated above, i.e. they are
diVerent from Monsignor Quixote’s riddles, Descartes’ philoso-
phical method, Luther’s aZictions, or a fashionable sceptical
lifestyle. They are diVerent from our common perception of
doubt. If, however, we allow for a wider definition of doubt, this
nomenclature might still be applicable.
And indeed, the correlation between doubt in the word of God
and dispute against God is a central theme in Reformation
theology; it has already surfaced in our discussion of Calvin’s
132 S. Eli. Zut. 2 (trans. Meir Friedmann).
133 Tg. Ps.-J. Gen. 15:13 (trans. Michael Maher).
134 Tg. Ps.-J. Gen. 15:6 (trans. Michael Maher).
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commentary, where he argued that ‘doubt’ means to inquire and to
search into God’s promise through diYdence (disquirere) and that
‘no greater dishonour can be done to him, than to refuse his
oVered favour, or to discredit his word’. In an even more radical
manner, Martin Luther unfolds this line of thought in his grand
lecture on Genesis (1535–45). There, he explains that Adam’s fall
set in with the question of the sanctimonious serpent: ‘Has God
indeed said?’ (Gen. 3:1). Adam’s sin was not the eating of the
fruit, but his engaging in the serpent’s question, his challenging
and doubting God’s word.135 According to Luther, ‘doubt
transforms into unbelief, if it disengages itself from the relation-
ship with God . . . Those who take matters into their own hands,
who seek to establish themselves, they believe that they can
dispense with listening and responding.’136 Adam claimed
autonomy and ‘began to ‘‘argue about God’’ ’, and so—as
Bultmann comments—he ‘set himself outside God and made
God’s claim upon men a debatable problem’.137 There is a kind of
doubt that transforms into a sinful dispute; doubt as a trustful and
intimate disputare (cum deo) ‘in faith’ may lead to doubt as a
distanced and rebellious disputare (de deo) ‘in unbelief’. This is
where theologically ‘doubt’ and ‘dispute’ overlap, and at the same
time this is what separates Adam, the ‘paradigmatic sinner’, from
Abraham, the ‘paradigmatic believer’: contrary to Adam,
Abraham did not set himself outside God ‘in unbelief’ through
doubt and dispute, but rather maintained a strong and trustful
salvific relationship with God.
Yet this is a theological thought and not a philological one, a
question of interpretation and not of lexicography.
135 Cf. Oswald Bayer, Martin Luthers Theologie: Eine Vergegenwa¨rtigung (3rd
edn.; Tu¨bingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2007), p. 162 (referring to WA 42, 120.25–
122.19).
136 Bayer, Martin Luthers Theologie, p. 162.
137 Rudolf Bultmann, ‘What does It Mean to Speak of God?’, in Faith and
Understanding, vol. 1, trans. Louise P. Smith (New York: Harper & Row,
1969), pp. 53–65, at 54¼ ‘Welchen Sinn hat es, von Gott zu reden?’ (1925),
in idem, Glauben und Verstehen. Gesammelte Aufsa¨tze, vol. 1 (Tu¨bingen: Mohr
Siebeck, 1933), pp. 26–37, at 27.
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